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Raising The Stakes: The Impact of HakiElimu’s Advocacy Work on Education Policy and Budget in Tanzania
Ruth Carlitz and Rosie McGee

Introduction

HakiElimu – “right to education” in Kiswahili – is a Tanzanian organization that works for “an open, just and democratic Tanzania, where all people enjoy the right to education that promotes equity, creativity, and critical thinking.” Established in 2001, it deploys a wide range of activities to address a broad set of issues related to governance, accountability, and education.

HakiElimu’s focus on education, on one hand, reflects the inherent importance of education in a country at Tanzania’s level of development, as well as Tanzania’s political history. Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, the first post-colonial President of Tanzania and founder of the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), became known around the world for his pioneering commitment to education as a means of liberation. On the other hand, to understand HakiElimu one needs to understand advocacy on education policy, budget, and performance as a way into the more politically challenging and contentious advocacy arena of governance, accountability, and democratization.

The research on which this report is based was conducted as one case study in a research program of four commissioned by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) to monitor the kinds of impact that IBP partners achieve and to uncover the nature of such impact and the factors that shape it. This case study focuses on HakiElimu’s activities related to three main issue areas over the period 2008-2012, and the concrete data that we provide on budgets and program and policy implementation relate to that period. The choice of 2008 as the starting point for this case study is appropriate in that it marked the beginning of a new four-year strategy for HakiElimu and also coincided with the assumption of a new Director.

1 The authors of this report (Rosemary McGee and Ruth Carlitz) took on the role of case study researchers in June 2011 and made their first visit to Tanzania in August 2011, two-thirds of the way into the case study period. As the third team of researchers working on it, we adopted the same timeframe that the previous researchers had selected. The previous case study team attempted to construct a 2008 qualitative baseline retrospectively, by conducting a semi-structured interview with a purposive sample of nine well-informed observers and analysts of the education policy scene from official donor agencies, international NGOs, and national civil society organizations. However, this proved methodologically problematic and unreliable.

Ruth Carlitz is a consultant and PhD candidate in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, U.S. She worked with HakiElimu in the Policy Analysis and Advocacy unit from 2006-2008 (prior to the period covered by this case study). Rosie McGee is a Fellow in the Participation, Power and Social Change team at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, U.K. The views expressed are of the authors. Facts and figures stated and assertions made have been checked and approved by HakiElimu.

in the first leadership transition since the organization’s founding. Given the nature of HakiElimu’s work and the context in which the work was undertaken, a rigid adherence to one tidy baseline at a single point in time would have restricted the research. Much of what HakiElimu has done since 2008 has grown out of roots laid down before, and many post-2008 changes in education sector policy, budget, and performance cannot be explained without longer historical perspective. In particular, certain features and trends in the nature of Tanzanian governance and citizen-state relations, highly relevant to the very nature and mission of HakiElimu, go back much further.

The research has sought to document and assess the interventions of HakiElimu with a view to establishing what impact it has had, how this impact has been achieved, and the influence of various factors on the scope for impact. Our methodology consists of a longitudinal qualitative case study conducted over three years. We have approached it in inductive and exploratory mode, as befits both the context — wherein multiple stakeholders are affecting the variables of interest — and our intention to answer not only “what” questions but also “why” and “how” questions.

Through interviews and focus group discussions with HakiElimu staff members and a range of other actors connected to the education sector in Tanzania, we have explored developments that have occurred since 2008, and how our sources explain these changes. When their explanations involved civil society advocacy activities in general or HakiElimu in particular, we explored the ways in which HakiElimu effected change, and the contribution those interviewed perceive HakiElimu having made in relation to other actors also influencing the status quo. We enquired into other plausible explanations for the observed changes, alternative or additional to civil society advocacy, and drew on our review of secondary evidence to test or substantiate the observations of change and the sources’ explanations for how they occurred. Through these steps we incorporated into our research strategy important elements of contribution analysis, used to determine to what extent observed results are due to program activities rather than other factors.

What was the organization responding to?

As noted above, HakiElimu’s advocacy work on education is deeply connected to issues of governance, accountability, and democratization. Hence, understanding the organization’s way of working, and its potential for impact, requires an understanding of Tanzania’s broader policy context. In this section we begin by providing that broader contextual information and then explain how it is manifested in the education sector, in order to locate the specific challenges that HakiElimu addresses in their rightful context.

Political scientists classify Tanzania as a "weakly democratic" or "hybrid" regime. This classification stems primarily from the ruling party's hegemonic position, which it has maintained since independence in 1961. Although Tanzania legalized multiparty politics in the early 1990s, little progress has been made in recent years toward fully realizing...
democracy. Developmental outcomes have stagnated, as well: Tanzania is currently ranked 152 out of 187 countries with comparable data on the Human Development Index, placing it slightly above the regional average for sub-Saharan Africa but still illustrating major challenges. Two striking features of the political system are the dominance of the executive and the strength of the ruling party. The ruling party CCM, in power since independence, maintains its dominant position through electoral rules and party financing systems. Given the weak and formalistic nature of Tanzania’s legislature, one in-depth study on patterns of accountability in Tanzania suggests that “the party structures probably represent the most effective form of democratic restraint over the Executive.”

Reflecting the dominance of the ruling party, policy making in Tanzania has tended to be a top-down process. The fact that Tanzania receives such a significant amount of foreign aid (amounting to approximately 33 percent of government spending in financial year 2010-11) has meant that the country’s guiding policy framework (MKUKUTA, Tanzania’s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty) represents the orientation of foreign donors to a significant extent. Indeed, the government is frequently characterized as more accountable to its foreign funders than to any other non-state actors. While government leaders have rhetorically committed themselves to MKUKUTA because it generates necessary funds, they have demonstrated weaker commitments to fully implementing it.

Indeed, policy “slippage” is a widely cited problem in Tanzania, to which government officials readily admit. Participants in focus group discussions we conducted in a rural village in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania (Njombe) lamented a disconnect between what they hear the government promise and what they see on the ground. As one participant noted, “We carry the burden while the government brags of its achievements.” We heard similar complaints during field visits to Northern Tanzania (Ukerewe and Serengeti). Scholars and other observers of Tanzanian politics cite a variety of related reasons for the lack of policy implementation, including poor organization of government and inadequately developed infrastructure, especially in rural areas. Policy slippage is also seen as caused by delegation problems, with the central government reluctant to delegate authority to other levels or, where it does so, authority being too dispersed to implement policy effectively. The country’s reliance on foreign aid may also play a role, leading to delays in the disbursement of donor funds, as well as a general lack of accountability for funds received through general budget support. Only in 2012 have key donors pulled back

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6 As evidence of this, Tanzania’s Polity score has remained the same since the first multi-party election in 1995. A country’s Polity Score is the aggregate of six component measures that aim to record what are called key qualities of democracies: executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It ranks countries on a 21-point democracy/autocracy scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Tanzania has received a score of -1 on this scale since 1995, which classifies the country as an “anocracy.” For more information see [http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).


8 Hussman and Muya, 2007, p. 175.


12 Interviews with Francis Liboy; Dept. of Policy and Planning Officials Chonywa, Head of Policy Section; Management Info System Head, August 2012.

13 For more background on these focus group discussions, see Annex 1.

14 Hyden and Mmuya, 2008, p. 86.

15 Interviews with Joseph Mungai, Francis Liboy, and Semkae Kilonzo, August 2012.
from general budget support and decided to channel some of their aid back into projects, in response to the agencies’ growing concerns at the impossibility of demonstrating positive outcomes from it, and amid harsh criticisms by the U.K.’s Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI).16

Finally, the institutionalization of political clientelism is seen as a major culprit for the lack of policy implementation.17 Those who can use their personal power (often boosted by occupying public office) steer resource flows toward privileged groups or communities. This tendency is particularly pronounced among elected leaders, but concerns appointed officials, as well. Close observers of Tanzanian politics hold that corruption is tolerated so long as local constituents receive sufficient resources from those in power (even if such resources are channeled in a “clientelistic” fashion). In this way, accountability to the electorate serves as a weak check on CCM and the executive. However, this check has limited consequences in terms of policy implementation since, according to some experts, many citizens are less interested in how they obtain a particular good or resource than the fact that it gets delivered.18 As one participant in a focus group discussion in Njombe explained, for an MP to stay in power, he or she must deliver.

As the backdrop to this institutional and policy context, Nyerere’s influence endures. Thanks to his emphasis on education, including the emphasis on it as a route to the nation’s and the community’s self-reliance, education holds a special place in Tanzanian politics, history, and public opinion. Yet, his patriarchal relationship with his subjects and patrimonial approach to dispensing public goods have also left their mark, especially on the CCM’s bureaucracy and possibly on the meaning and practice of accountability.19 A recent article on educational policy making in the former colony cites Nyerere as declaring, “[W]e must run while others walk,” and noting that in the urgency to develop,

“we cannot afford liberal checks and balances. . . . Our constitution differs from the American system in that it . . . enables the executive to function without being checked at every turn. . . . Our need is not for brakes to social change . . . our lack of trained manpower and capital resources, and even our climate, act too effectively already.”20

The country’s legal framework still includes legislation that criminalizes publicly criticizing the government and places the burden of proof on the defendant.21

Tanzania’s education sector provides a clear — if somewhat dismal — illustration of the broader governance challenges discussed above. In particular, the sector exhibits the negative effects of the country’s dependence on foreign aid, as well as a lack of accountability, with policies adopted but not fully implemented.

Understanding the current challenges in the education sector requires going back to 2001 when the Tanzanian government began a renewed attempt to achieve universal primary

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16 Independent Commission for Aid Impact 2012.
18 Ibid, p. 44.
19 As one reflection of this relationship, Nyerere was widely known as “Baba wa Taifa,” or “Father of the Nation.”
education (UPE).\textsuperscript{22} Whereas previous efforts to achieve UPE were largely the result of Nyerere’s efforts to realize a vision of “education for liberation,” more recent attempts not only reflect the ruling party’s interest in expanding access to education but also have been influenced by the Education for All (EFA) movement and the education targets within the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which have provided an impetus for many African countries to adopt similar reforms.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, UPE would not be possible without support from donors. The World Bank gave a US$150 billion loan for primary education in 2001 and was very influential in the scrapping of primary school fees in 2001.\textsuperscript{24} Tanzania’s guiding policy document for primary education is the \textit{Primary Education Development Plan} (PEDP), which it began implementing in 2002.\textsuperscript{25} Efforts to expand access to primary education were shortly followed by efforts to expand secondary education, with the implementation of a \textit{Secondary Education Development Plan} (SEDP) beginning in 2004.\textsuperscript{26} Again, foreign support played an important role, with the World Bank providing another US$150 million.\textsuperscript{27}

One of the key innovations of both PEDP and SEDP was to provide a capitation grant, which was meant to replace revenue lost to schools through the abolition of school fees and to improve the quality of education by making teaching and learning materials more widely available. In particular, the capitation grant was meant to finance the purchase of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, as well as to fund repairs, administration materials, and examination expenses.\textsuperscript{28} The capitation grant was initially set at US$10 per student under PEDP I and TZS 25,000 per student under SEDP I (approximately US$16 at 2004 exchange rates). PEDP and SEDP also included ambitious targets with respect to other important aspects of education quality, including the construction of new classrooms and adoption of measures to recruit and support the additional teachers that would be necessary to accommodate dramatic enrollment expansions.

Before looking at the ways in which PEDP and SEDP have been implemented (or not, as the case may be in many instances), it is important to understand the institutional framework through which education policies are developed, budgeted for, and implemented. Responsibility for the education sector is divided across a number of ministries. The Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) is responsible for policy formulation, coordination, monitoring, setting standards, quality assurance, and quality control of the whole education system, but notably does not control the majority of resources for the education sector, nor manage the day-to-day operation of schools. Rather, in line with broader decentralization reforms, the Prime Minister’s Office-Regional Administration and

\textsuperscript{22} In the mid-1970s CCM decided to aim for UPE by 1984. The statistics for primary enrollment and adult literacy in the early eighties are very impressive; the gross enrollment ratio (GER) for 1980 was 98 percent and compared well with those of other sub-Saharan countries. However, by the 1990s, the GER had fallen to below 80 percent and continued to decline throughout that decade (Ruth Wedgwood, “Post-Basic Education and Poverty in Tanzania,” Post-Basic Education and Training Working Paper Series - N°1, July 2005, p. 8).


\textsuperscript{24} Wedgwood, 2005, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{25} The first phase of PEDP spanned the 2002-2006 period, and was then followed by PEDP II, covering 2007-2011. The government is currently finalizing PEDP III.

\textsuperscript{26} The first phase of SEDP spanned the period 2004-2009, and the government is currently implementing SEDP II, which covers 2007-2015.

\textsuperscript{27} These funds were provided partly as a loan and partly as a grant (Wedgwood, 2007, p. 391).

\textsuperscript{28} Twaweza, “Capitation Grant for Education: When will it make a difference?” Policy brief TZ.08/2010E.
Local Government (PMO-RALG) supervises and monitors management of pre-primary, primary, and secondary education by Local Government Authorities (LGAs).29 The LGAs (districts, towns, municipal and city councils) are then fully responsible for the management and delivery of both formal and informal basic education services. MOEVT retains management responsibility for higher education, vocational training, and Teacher Training Colleges. The Ministry of Finance also plays an important role, since MOEVT’s and PMO-RALG’s budgets are the outcome of a close negotiation with the Ministry of Finance, which often hinges on ministers’ advocacy efforts.30 Another ministry, the President’s Office-Public Service Management (PO-PSM), determines teachers’ salaries. However, the Ministry of Finance is in charge of disbursing the salaries of district teachers. This convoluted institutional structure makes it extremely difficult to monitor budget allocations and execution in the sector.

Changes to MoEVT leadership have also created instability in the sector, which results in a lack of shared vision and strategy. Since the current President came to power in 2005, there have been three different Ministers for Education, each of whom has attempted to make major changes to the sector. In addition, MoEVT is characterized by a number of “acting” officials in high-level positions. Our interviewees were of various opinions as to whether this reflects a strategic move by the President, but it clearly creates challenges in terms of answerability.

In terms of recent trends in policy implementation, PEDP and SEDP have dramatically expanded access to primary and secondary education. At primary level, the Gross Enrollment Rate increased from 78 percent to 112 percent between 2000 and 2006.31 Actual enrollment grew by over 60 percent, up from 4.4 million in 2000 to well over 7 million in 2006.32 Expansions in access to secondary education have been even more dramatic. For example, 401,011 students were enrolled in the first year of secondary school in 2007, up from 148,412 just two years earlier. These numbers far exceeded SEDP projections and likely resulted from the impact of two related directives issued by former Prime Minister Edward Lowassa, namely to build a secondary school in each ward and to enroll 75 percent of those who pass the primary education examinations.

While these improvements in access to educational opportunities may be laudable in their own right, they have created major strains on Tanzania’s education system. Principal among these is a shortage of qualified teachers. Despite government efforts to recruit more teachers, wide disparities remain in terms of teacher deployment, with many teachers failing to show up to schools where they have been posted. Overcrowding has been common since the advent of PEDP and SEDP, with some classes reportedly accommodating over 100

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29 Secondary schools were managed by MOEVT up until 2011.
30 Interview with former Minister for Education Joseph Mungai, August 2012.
31 The Gross Enrollment Rate refers to the number of children enrolled in a level (primary or secondary), regardless of age, divided by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the same level. As a result it can exceed 100 percent.
32 The gross enrollment rate is the total number of children in school divided by the total number of children of school age.
The shortage of qualified teachers has created additional strains on the welfare of teachers who stay in the system.\textsuperscript{34}

The Tanzanian government’s initial response to the teacher shortage was largely in keeping with the politicized nature of the policy process. In 2006 it reduced normal teaching diploma training from a two-year taught course to a one-year taught course and one year’s teaching experience. Furthermore, in an attempt to fill acute gaps even more quickly, the government instituted a “crash program” nicknamed VodaFasta (a reference to a rapid electronic airtime distribution and recharge service promoted by one of Tanzania’s major mobile phone companies) through which high school leavers were “trained” in as few as three months before being dispatched to schools.\textsuperscript{35} Around the same time came a directive from former Prime Minister Lowassa to build secondary school in every ward. While intended to address what was indeed a pressing need given large numbers of children now leaving primary school, Lowassa’s action did not reflect policy. It was seen as a “blatant political decision” — described by a former ministry official as “ignoring policy, [because] that’s politics.”\textsuperscript{36, 37} Since that decision was taken, Tanzania has seen its secondary education sector expand faster than any other country in the world. However, the newly established “ward schools” typically exhibit much worse conditions in terms of staffing and teachers’ qualifications.\textsuperscript{38}

In 2008 the government launched a Teacher Development and Management Strategy (TDMS), which focuses on providing in-service training to teachers and strengthening Teachers’ Resource Centers. However, as HakiElimu’s recent advocacy efforts have highlighted, the TDMS has not been fully implemented. In addition, the government has also failed to reach a number of the other ambitious targets set out in PEDP and SEDP. In particular, budget allocations for the capitation grant have failed to meet the amounts targeted in the policies, and actual disbursements have been less than what is budgeted, as well as unpredictable and unequally distributed.\textsuperscript{39} Teacher recruitment and retention remains problematic, as well, due in part to low salaries and lack of sufficient incentives to move to the rural areas where they are most needed. Our focus group discussions and field visits revealed that this lack of policy implementation has dire consequences. In addition to severe teacher shortages, people lamented the lack of teaching and learning materials in their schools and explained that parents are often forced to make significant contributions to pay “volunteer” teachers and keep schools running. Some focus group participants in Njombe suggested that the government should be honest about its inability to provide a truly free primary education, then at least parents could prepare.

\textsuperscript{33} For instance, participants in a focus group discussion in Njombe explained that their local primary school had over 300 students and only three teachers, one of whom is head teacher.

\textsuperscript{34} Noted in recent HakiElimu briefs, “Education in Reverse,” Brief No. 10.1E, and “Dwindling Capitation Grants (PEDP II)” n.d.

\textsuperscript{35} HakiElimu, 2008, p. 5. Speaking at a fundraising event for the construction of more dormitories at Irkisongo Secondary School in Monduli on 30 December 2006, then Prime Minister Edward Lowassa announced that the government would undertake a crash program to recruit enough teachers into state schools to cope with the increasing number of secondary schools (HakiElimu, 2007, p. 1). These became known as “unqualified” or “licensed” teachers. Also employed in many state schools are “nonprofessional” teachers, who are Standard VII graduates or college graduates with degrees in subject areas other than education and no teaching qualifications. Though paid, these are often called “volunteers,” as opposed to “degree” teachers, who have a University degree in education, or “diploma” teachers, who have a teaching college diploma.

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Joseph Mmbando, former PEDP Coordinator 2002-5, December 2011.

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with HakiElimu’s Media Unit, 10 August 2011.

\textsuperscript{38} Twaweza, 2010.
Up until 2008, when we begin our detailed look at HakiElimu’s activities, the government was still touting its achievements with respect to quantitative achievements in access and enrollment and largely ignoring the ways in which a dramatic enrollment expansion might have a negative impact on educational quality. This lack of attention to the quality of education provided in schools is the main issue that HakiElimu has been responding to over the period of this case study (2008-2012). However, since the organization is not organized around a single-issue campaign, we had to devise a means of studying their efforts to respond to this issue through their advocacy related to education budget and policy. Through focus group discussions with HakiElimu staff members and semi-structured interviews with a range of external observers, we have explored developments in the education sector through a more focused set of lenses. These consist of three specific budget aspects that HakiElimu has been prioritizing as key to improving education quality: teacher training, teachers’ housing, and the capitation grant for primary and secondary education. The next section describes in more detail how HakiElimu came to work on these areas and then describes the various activities that the organization has undertaken over the past four years.

How does the organization work?

As noted in the previous section, HakiElimu focuses a significant amount of energy on teacher training, teacher housing, and the capitation grant since these areas are seen as key entry points to improving the quality of education. It is important to note that HakiElimu does not tightly adhere to a single “theory of change,” nor did it initiate a specific campaign targeting these three areas. Indeed, as HakiElimu’s executive director explains, teacher training, teacher housing and the capitation grant are not the only — or most important — things that the organization focuses on. Rather, they were selected as the basis of this case study since they represent areas in which HakiElimu engages each year, and will continue to engage in the future. In addition, these three have direct budgetary connections and so make sense in the framework of a case study commissioned by the IBP. In order to understand the work that HakiElimu has done related to these three issue areas, one must take a broader look at the organization’s operation as a whole, which is what we do in this section. We then narrow our focus back to the three issue areas and highlight a few illustrative and impactful activities, the impact of which we discuss in the following section.

HakiElimu is a Tanzanian civil society organization (CSO) operating in an aid-dependent civil society sector in an aid-dependent country. Some of its donors locate it within the

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40 We make this distinction because each of the other three case studies conducted for the IBP Partnership Initiative’s research focuses on a single-issue campaign, not on an organization all of whose work centres on the budget-related advocacy that is explored by this research. The campaigns researched in the other cases may be led by one organization or driven forward by a platform or coalition of organizations, but in each of the other three cases case it is the campaign itself, rather than the participating or leading organization(s), that is the focus.

41 These observers included Kate Dyer (AcT); Tanya Zebroff (DFID Tanzania), Audax Tibuhinda (UNICEF Tanzania), Antony Mvungu (Tanzanian Teachers’ Union), Helima Mengele (TEN/MET), Suleiman Sumra (UWEZO Tanzania), and Blaustus Mwizarubi (CARE International). Interviews had already been conducted by the previous research team with many of these plus Neville Meena (journalist).

42 Interview with Elizabeth Missokia, December 2011.

43 This point is relevant because it is another point of contrast between the Tanzania case study and the other three, conducted in Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa, none of which are aid-dependent countries.
education portfolio of their civil society support programs, while others locate it within their governance or accountability portfolios in keeping with the higher-level democratizing aims that lie behind its operational focus on advocacy on education budget and policy.

While several of HakiElimu’s founding members are critical of the ruling party and its style of government, HakiElimu’s objective has always been to make the existing education system work better rather than to introduce fundamental changes to it. It works on the principle that the shortcomings in educational quality stem not primarily from deficient policies, but rather from a lack of policy implementation, poor resource allocation, and weak government accountability. HakiElimu’s strategy, therefore, is to “hold up a mirror to government,” drawing the attention of government, donors, and the public to instances and patterns of poor or no implementation of policies and budgets. By so doing, the organization seeks to raise the political cost of inaction on these issues within the education sector. The nation’s historical commitment to education means that holding up the mirror to government in this sector can be expected to have a particularly rallying effect.

One necessary ingredient for the strategy to work is a degree of openness and transparency in government, so that policies and budget allocations are known to the public. The CCM regime is characterized by a culture of secrecy and a “closed-space” tradition of policy making, identified by some commentators as a legacy of Tanzanian socialism. That is why HakiElimu simultaneously pushes government toward more transparent governance and often disseminates official policy and budget information itself in the absence of faster progress on that front.

For more open and transparent government to lead to better education sector performance and outcomes, another ingredient is vital: an engaged, questioning public, moved to take action. According to HakiElimu’s previous strategy (covering the period 2008–2011, and hence the majority of our case study period), HakiElimu was primarily working to achieve the following goal: “Citizens are better informed, organizing and engaged to realize quality basic education for liberation and democracy.” The strategy goes on to note:

“This goal will be realized through the achievement of the following four key outcomes:

1. Ordinary citizens across Tanzania are informed about basic education for liberation and democracy.
2. There is a broader, better informed and more imaginative debate on quality basic education and citizen agency.
3. Citizens across Tanzania are expressing their views and taking action to hold government accountable and making a difference in their own communities.
4. Government and other public institutions are more responsive to citizens’ views and demands.”

44 This exact phrase was used to describe to us the contribution made by civil society advocacy organizations like HakiElimu by both an interviewee in government and by one of HakiElimu’s founding members.
46 Among other ways, by being the lead Tanzania research organization in the IBP-led Open Budget Survey every two years.
To develop a fuller picture of how the organization works than we could glean from organizational documentation, we observed everyday life in the organization and interviewed staff members in all the units. The impression we formed is that its implicit, “lived” theory of change can be summed up as:

i. raise awareness and produce information and analysis to equip citizens to take action alone, push government to fulfill its promises, and inform donors so that they influence government;

ii. while working on a set of issues and gathering rigorous evidence on them, react and respond to unfolding events related to these issues; and

iii. hold government to account for the implementation of its own policies and commitments.

HakiElimu has not aimed at specific changes to budget policy or budget process with respect to teacher training, teacher housing, and the capitiation grant. Rather, its activities have aimed to raise the profile of these areas, and in so doing, raise the stakes for government of failing to allocate sufficient funds to these priorities and to fully implement their inherent commitments to these priorities articulated in PEDP, SEDP, and the TDMS.

In February 2010 HakiElimu initiated a specific campaign around in-service training for teachers. The issue for the campaign was chosen through a participatory formulation of HakiElimu’s advocacy strategy and aimed at the following strategic objective: “Ensure continued in-service teacher training and professional growth.” Despite the focus on a particular issue, the campaign did not include specific budget-related targets, in keeping with HakiElimu’s strategic reading of the policy environment in which it operates.

During the 2008-2011 strategy period, HakiElimu was organized into four program units: Media, Information Access, Citizen Engagement, and Policy Analysis and Advocacy. The main activities of each program unit are outlined in Table 1 below.

Table 1: HakiElimu’s ways of working

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<tr>
<th>Program Unit</th>
<th>Ways of Working</th>
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<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>• Conducting media surveys (in which journalists are supported to conduct field-based surveys on HakiElimu’s key issues and use the findings in print and televised media outputs)</td>
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<td>• Running media programs (TV and radio shows)</td>
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<td>• Producing media spots (TV and radio advertisements; billboards)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Monitoring media</td>
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<td>Information Access</td>
<td>• Producing free publications aimed at “the average Tanzanian” (including cartoon booklets, newsletters, and an annual calendar)</td>
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<td>• Staging public competitions in essay writing or drawing on specific issues</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Distributing publications produced by other units to all interested sectors</td>
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48 HakiElimu, “The Campaign for In-Service Teacher Training: First Year Monitoring Report,” (May 2011)
Operationally speaking, then, the strategy works “from above” and “from below.” On the one hand, relevant government institutions, including the legislature and the executive, are targeted with efforts to change their behavior. This is done through a combination of tactics that range from strategic lobbying and quiet high-level advocacy, through pressure for transparency and accountability, to producing and presenting empirical data on education and education-related spending. On the other hand, citizens are targeted through electronic and traditional media (newspaper, publications, radio, and TV), public forums and with tailored information produced and disseminated to and through a network of grassroots volunteers, the Friends of Education. Since its founding, HakiElimu has mobilized a countrywide grassroots network of over 30,000 Friends, including community organizations and individuals who have signed up to receive periodic disbursements (by mail) of HakiElimu publications and other relevant documents (such as government budget speeches) and are also informed of opportunities for networking and capacity building. Although HakiElimu provides limited financial support for some Friends’ activities (such as building community libraries) the network is fairly loose and self-sustaining and only about 1,000 of the Friends can be considered to be very active. The Friends of Education movement was conceived for the purpose of encouraging active citizenry and expanding community participation on education advancement efforts.

In terms of the issue areas that form the basis of this report, Friends’ activities are most prominent in relation to monitoring disbursements of the primary school capitation grant. In 2008, following a contentious process to obtain permission from the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, HakiElimu began distributing a “PEDP Monitoring Tool” to enable tracking of policy implementation at the school level. Since then, HakiElimu has also conducted training for Friends on policy monitoring and has distributed a policy monitoring handbook. In 2009 a SEDP monitoring tool was developed and distributed, as well.

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49 Interview with Citizen Engagement Unit, August 2011.
Table 1 shows that HakiElimu’s work rarely has a single target audience. Indeed the bulk of its outputs aim at informing and spurring discussion among the broad public. The organization has increasingly come to see the necessity of basing their media messages on painstakingly accurate evidence. HakiElimu conducts its own primary research (including local-level public expenditure tracking exercises and school-level resource transfer and expenditure monitoring, and completing the Open Budget Survey at national level) and also conducts secondary research, especially into government commitments and efforts that aim to connect disparate commitments and actions by different institutional actors involved in education. This research then forms the basis of HakiElimu’s media spots and other popular outputs.

HakiElimu uses the media for more than disseminating its findings and recommendations, and thus deepening its impact. The organization also uses the media as an indirect route to citizen and CSO mobilization (which IBP identifies as another impact pathway) by channeling official information to the public and critiquing it, thereby raising public awareness. HakiElimu also uses the media to initiate and maintain debates between civil society, the public, and government, in the absence of other spaces where these governance debates can happen. Finally, it monitors the media as a way of monitoring rhetorical and actual government stances on education and government sentiment toward HakiElimu and civil society advocacy in general. The organization has strong media technical capacity and a thoughtful media strategy that takes advantage of Tanzania’s recently improved media freedoms; community radio and private television broadcasters now reach wide audiences, and journalistic capacity is improving. Indeed, HakiElimu seeks to bolster the capacity of journalists by providing training and advice on investigative journalism.

HakiElimu frames its messages in a thought provoking way, often dramatizing the negative consequences of government’s failures to fully implement policy. HakiElimu spots and popular publications also frequently use humor. HakiElimu’s style has typically centered on encouraging people to question the status quo, rather than providing specific suggestions for improving policy. This has led to criticism by government officials and even among other members of Tanzanian citizen society that all HakiElimu does is complain. As we will explain in greater detail below, there is some evidence that HakiElimu is responding to these criticisms and adopting a more constructive approach, which may account for some of the organization’s recent successes.

In terms of the strategic partners with which HakiElimu has carried out these various actions and campaigns, at the national level these consist of the core group of education sector advocacy actors with which HakiElimu has worked for some time: the Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET, an umbrella organization of CSOs working on education issues), Policy Forum (especially its Budget Working Group), Tanzania Teachers’ Union, Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP), and UNICEF. At the local level key partners are Teacher Resource Centers, Teacher Training Colleges, teachers, students and parents, as well as some regional and district-level CSOs, such as Mwanza Policy Initiative, or Oxfam in certain areas. More recent additions are Daraja (an organization aiming to make positive changes to life in rural Tanzania by bringing people and government closer together), and
Uwezo (a four-year initiative that aims to improve competencies in literacy and numeracy among children in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda).  

Some civil society peers observe that over recent years the organization’s priorities may have changed with respect to networking and collaborating with strategic civil society partners, with relatively more energy going into networking with parts of government. HakiElimu’s relatively autonomous way of working may reflect a strategic reading of the civil society landscape, particularly with respect to working through TEN/MET, which is currently seen as rather weak. HakiElimu’s work also reaches donor organizations, which are sent publications and invited to launch events and in some cases have used HakiElimu’s research to justify their own actions vis-à-vis the Government of Tanzania.

HakiElimu identifies a limited number of individuals and units within government who it considers strategic partners or allies. For instance, the in-service training advocacy campaign identifies the Teacher Education Department of the MoEVT and the Basic Education Development Committee as having authored the strategy that the campaign seeks to get implemented. But, in general, government actors or units are seen as either targets or likely opponents rather than allies. Although the executive is indirectly targeted through many activities that are directed at the general public or Friends of Education, for the most part specific government actors are not targeted directly with evidence: this is not seen as an effective advocacy approach.

In HakiElimu’s early years, the organization’s leadership spent considerable time and energy trying to get a seat at the table of high-level discussions between government and donors, through the official dialogue structure. However, as one of HakiElimu’s founding members explained, civil society participation through these official channels became less meaningful over time, and the organization decided there were better uses of its time, including working with local government actors. Currently, HakiElimu’s activities with respect to engaging with the executive are limited to targeting some key decision-maker technocrats within the MoEVT (including the Policy and Planning Division and Management and Administration Section of the Teacher Education Department), as well as the director of Budget in the Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister’s Office-Regional Administration and Local Government (responsible for the capitation grant); ruling party and opposition party parliamentarians; and local government officials, including District Education Officers. HakiElimu usually distributes publications to key actors from this list or invites them to launches, but the political context and background described above serve to explain why the executive is not more directly and systematically targeted and why direct work with parliament has intensified only recently (see below). While HakiElimu staff members still attend some high-level meetings with the Ministry of Finance, they see engagement at the local level as a relatively more effective and productive means of working with government.

In addition to engagement with local government officials, such as District Education Officers, HakiElimu has begun providing training to local government leaders on the concept of high-quality education, importance of education in society, children’s rights,

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50 For more information see www.uwezo.net.
51 Interviews with Suleman Sumra, Tanya Zebroff, and Minou Fuglesang.
52 Interview with Suleman Sumra.
governance, democracy, social accountability monitoring, budget and public expenditure, and the legal framework in education.

Finally, HakiElimu has established a closer working relationship with the legislature. In July 2011 a group of young members of parliament (MPs) established an Education Caucus and asked HakiElimu to help manage the secretariat.53 According to one close observer of the education sector, this shows that HakiElimu had established a certain degree of legitimacy and expertise.54 This is an example of an activity that HakiElimu did not specifically plan but implemented in response to a perceived strategic entry point for impact (though MPs were identified more generally in the 2008-2011 strategy as important change agents). Likewise, during the preparation of the 2012-13 budget, HakiElimu was contacted by the parliamentary Social Services Committee to give its members some basic budget analysis training. HakiElimu staff members made a presentation to the committee, analyzing the draft budget and proposing questions for committee members to ask the Minister of Education. HakiElimu’s presentation highlighted such issues as a proposed decrease in the ministry’s development budget and a concurrent proposed increase in the recurrent budget (which goes to pay ministry salaries) and encouraged committee members to ask what explained the shifts. In contrast with previous years, the committee refused to simply “rubber stamp” the budget proposal upon first reading but sent it back to MOEVT and PMO-RALG for review and changes, as advised by HakiElimu.55

For the most part, HakiElimu implements its activities as planned, and rarely misses its financial targets. This may in part be due to HakiElimu’s relatively unique funding strategy, whereby its five donors all contribute to a four-year strategy through a common basket, rather than funding particular activities. In addition, HakiElimu’s executive director is seen as a very good manager, perhaps reflecting her experience working for international NGOs and funding agencies.56

What changed and what impact was achieved by the campaign?

The kinds of impact this research seeks to identify are contributions of civil society campaigns to changes in budget policy and budget process. Given the definition adopted by the IBP for this case study research, and bearing in mind the HakiElimu themes of teacher training, teacher housing, and capitation grant on which we are focusing, we are interested in changes in government budget policy related to the education sector, including changes in degrees of or attention to implementation in education policy; and changes in the practices and processes of budget policy making and budget setting and execution, including changes to formal and informal rules that govern these processes.

The task is not straightforward. First and foremost, HakiElimu recognizes that the problems in the education sector go beyond mere technical deficits. According to their reading of the education sector and broader policy environment, enhanced accountability is the needed remedy for the sector, as well as a much needed contribution to deeper, fairer democracy.

53 Interview with Zitto Kabwe, December 2011.
54 Interview with Tanya Zebroff, December 2011.
55 Interview with Elizabeth Missokia, August 2012, reflecting communication between the parliamentary committee and HakiElimu.
56 Interview with Kate Dyer, August 2012.
This means that a quest to assess HakiElimu’s impacts needs to go beyond a scan of policy statements and budget allocations and into the hazy and harder-to-research areas of degrees of policy implementation and of budget execution. It must go beyond a simple linear model of how policy changes into an understanding of the terrain as complex, contested, and dynamic; beyond measuring attribution to gauging contribution as one among many influencing factors and actors; beyond questions of research uptake and into questions of mobilization strategy; and beyond the realm of civil society and into that of political society and political behavior.

Second, the history of HakiElimu’s relationship with government is such that government cannot be expected to recognize HakiElimu’s influence where recognition is due. Thus, in relation to any observed changes in the three policy areas of interest, we are forced to rely on other ways to build up our understanding of causality, which draw on anecdotal and circumstantial evidence, reasonable deduction, inference, triangulation, and the demonstration of intermediate outcomes as the best proxies for final outcome indicators. A common assertion by our sources was that “HakiElimu made a lot of noise” and then things happened. We could not always find irrefutable published causal evidence of HakiElimu’s influence in relation to the positive changes in policy, which are unambiguously correlated with the “noise,” and we had significant difficulties arranging interviews with government actors who might have given enough clues as to a HakiElimu contribution to these changes. In our final visit, interviews with three senior government actors confirmed that they are aware of the work of HakiElimu among other education-focused CSOs; they deemed it “important” but did not provide evidence of causal relationships between the actions of HakiElimu and those of government.

Third, the most tried and tested approaches to assessing the impact of advocacy and mobilization initiatives are implicitly or explicitly based on ideal-type models of social change and policy change processes that do not always match reality, and certainly do not in the case of the Tanzanian education sector. There are several reasons for this. As Fox put it in his exploration of the uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability, “the shameless may not be vulnerable to public exposure.” Where policy implementation and budget execution wander so far adrift of plans and budget documents, not through accident or technical weaknesses but because people are benefitting from the status quo, an advocacy approach that assumes that benign technocrats will become fully accountable and their actions socially equitable if only they are given new information or grassroots perspectives, does not apply. Moreover, where the aid donor community does not hold the government in thrall, the possibility of donor pressure helping to make the standard linear CSO accountability model work is limited.

57 See, for instance, Reeler’s (2007) “projectable change” approach, viable only under contextual conditions that meet stringent criteria; Krznaric’s (2007) five main limitations to the way change is conceived in most development strategies; Eyben’s (2008) critical appraisal of how a group of women’s empowerment activist researchers defined policy; and the conception of the policy process that underpins some outputs of ODI’s RAPID network, which focuses on the use of research in development policy and practice. More generally, consider the (usually implicit) assumptions widespread in many research institutions about suitably disseminated good-quality research following a trouble-free path to policy change.

58 Fox, J., 2007, p. 663.

59 We should note one interviewee’s view that budget planning and execution has got even worse under President Kikwete than it was under predecessor Mwana. Mwana, who was a technocrat who believed in budgeting and staffing his Ministry of Finance with technocrats. Under Kikwete, ethno-religious considerations are a stronger factor than technical competence in staffing the Ministry of Finance (Interview with Rakesh Rajani).
Our approach to answering the question of what impact has been achieved by HakiElimu was not to elicit narratives from its staff and other actors about the organization’s work over the past few years. Instead, we started by eliciting views on whether things had changed in the three focal campaign areas of teacher training, teacher housing, and capitation grant; and if so, what the changes were, how the respondent(s) explained them, and, in their view, what role, if any, HakiElimu had played vis-à-vis other factors and actors. We did so because we wanted to capture both positive and negative changes, stasis, and changes to which HakiElimu may not have contributed, as well as instances of successful HakiElimu action in which we could then try to map causal relationships.

A key challenge in answering this question was the absence of a counterfactual – that is, a way of telling what the situation would have been like without HakiElimu’s interventions. We addressed this to the extent we could via a very simple version of “counterfactual thought-experiment,” asking respondents what education policy and budget would look like today if HakiElimu did not exist. Asking this question within the constraints of our interview settings meant that as a thought-experiment it was weakly specified and tangentially addressed, so we treat the outcomes of this question as interesting, informed, and informative speculation rather than valid counterfactual evidence.

According to focus group discussion participants and interviewees internal and external to HakiElimu, and to the verification we have been able to do via secondary sources, the policy-level changes that have occurred over this period do not amount to unequivocal steps forward, nor backward, and are changes in implementation and execution, not in policy formulation or budget allocation. The picture is one of small incremental changes happening simultaneously with regressive or counter-developments, which need to be teased out carefully to be spotted against the opaque and confusing policy landscape. The overall direction of change — positive or negative — is not always clear even within any one of the three areas, let alone in aggregate for all three areas.

Figure 1 compares policy targets with actual implementation for teacher training, teacher housing, and capitation grant for the case study research period. In order to put these changes in context, Figure 2 shows how overall priorities have shifted within the sector during the same period.

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60 Tetlock and Belkin, 1996.
Figure 1. Policy targets compared with actual implementation for teacher training, teacher housing, and capitation grant

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teacher Training</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Actual budget released as % of TDMS full implementation budget)</td>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Primary Teachers’ Houses</strong></td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Actual as % of PEDP II Target)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Capitation Grant</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Budgeted as per PEDP vs. actual disbursement to LGAs, in Billions of TZ shillings)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Capitation Grant</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Budgeted as per SEDP vs. actual disbursement to LGAs, in Billions of TZ shillings)</td>
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Teacher Development and Management Strategy (TDMS) 2008-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEDP I</th>
<th>PEDP II</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data sources: Teacher training and teacher housing figures prepared by HakiElimu staff, based on Government of Tanzania statistics. Capitation grant figures prepared by HakiElimu staff and authors based on Government of Tanzania statistics and reports produced by the Education Sector Development Committee.
Apart from a sudden rise in secondary capitation grant disbursements in 2011, the overall impression from Figure 1 is that there has been little improvement and even some worsening in budget execution for teacher training, teacher housing, and capitation grant. It is noteworthy that budget execution of the primary capitation grant has been considerably worse since 2010. However, our findings indicate that despite this overall negative impression, there have been some partial impacts and intermediate impacts on various target audiences in their different guises: government (executive and legislature), ordinary people (as community members and Friends, as citizens, and as electorate), other CSOs, and donor agencies.

The following four tables show impacts detected in our three focal areas, plus relevant impacts at a more general, environmental level. They distinguish the impacts by type, as per the types mentioned in the definition of impact adopted by the IBP for this research study (see definition at the start of this section). For each impact, the right-hand column briefly sums up the source(s) of the evidence that suggests a causal or contributive relationship between HakiElimu and this outcome or impact, so as to give an idea of how reliably we can consider each a consequence of HakiElimu’s actions. HakiElimu staff are frequently mentioned as sources. Every effort was made to corroborate evidence where it originated with HakiElimu staff, but this was not always possible, not least because of our much more limited access to government or donor actors than to HakiElimu.

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It is worth recalling at this point that HakiElimu does not primarily aim to bring about specific changes to budget policy or budget process. The four key outcomes it aspires to (set out in Section C above) are about citizen mobilization and responsive accountable government for the purpose of improving the quality of education. Both of these are phenomena that can contribute to or entail changes in budget policy or process but are not synonymous with them nor limited to them. The “Impacts reported or observed” in the tables include some changes in budget policy, implementation, execution, practices, or processes, which, if plausibly related to HakiElimu’s actions, can be considered intentional impacts because they are instances of the sort of citizen mobilization or of government responding or accounting to citizens and civil society actors that are the organization’s stated aims. Others, if related to HakiElimu’s actions, might be unintentional impacts.

Table 2: Impacts in the area of teacher training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact reported or observed</th>
<th>Nature of the evidence that suggests that HakiElimu's actions caused or contributed to the impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in the way budget policy decisions are made, and in who participates in these decisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rising public attention (2010 and after) to the shortage of teachers and to how difficulties in teacher retention led to poor-quality learning experience for pupils. Public debate and parliamentary attention focused on the issue, making the policy-focused debate more participatory.</td>
<td>HakiElimu broadcast “quality education” spots on TV and radio (2010). Its 2010 midyear report (p. 4), states that one of these, “Square Root,” became very popular and left a long popular legacy, such that Minister of Education Jumanne Maghembe issued directive in parliament that all student teachers at certificate level should be able to teach mathematics, among other subjects. Influence of this media spot was corroborated spontaneously by numerous interviewees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy decision taken (2009) to revoke teacher training crash-course options, amid broad public outcry and satire about improbable “VodaFasta” (crash course) approach to resolving the teacher shortage.</td>
<td>Several civil society advocates, including HakiElimu and the Tanzania Teachers’ Union, had been demanding the approach be revoked. Focus group with HakiElimu’s Information Access Unit (Aug 2011); HakiElimu Annual Report 2008 refers to the provision of support to investigative journalists to explore impact of nonprofessional teachers in response to government’s 2006 adoption of crash-course training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Education and Training Policy drafted (2012), after the rise of vocal</td>
<td>Interviews with staff suggest that the public concern was fueled by HakiElimu and other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
public concern about education quality. This indicates increased focus on teacher training.

CSOs and note that the policy emphasizes some of the education outcomes and quality issues that have been prioritized by HakiElimu and other advocacy CSOs and donor agencies.

Interviewees from MoEVT (Department of Policy and Planning) staff who drafted the policy said that HakiElimu among other CSOs had given “very good inputs.” While this hardly constitutes firm evidence, it is the most unambiguous and positive statement made to us by government interviewees about HakiElimu having had a positive impact.

Changes in taxation, budget allocations, and budget implementation

Decision by MoEVT (2011) to launch in-service training for English and mathematics teachers in response to ongoing advocacy and campaigns by HakiElimu and other CSOs on Teacher Management Development Strategy. In early 2011 government began to collaborate with UNICEF to start providing in-service teacher training through a pilot program in seven districts, and legislated to allow private providers to provide teacher training to help fill the gap, something that had been lobbied for by private commercial actors.

2011 Impact report by AcT (Accountability in Tanzania), one of HakiElimu’s main funders, which is funded by DFID and specializes in tracking impact of partners’ advocacy work using Outcome Mapping approach. This states: “[HakiElimu] was able to get the MoEVT to launch an in-service training for English and Mathematics teachers through focused advocacy campaigns and activities on Teacher Development Management Strategy (TDMS) (DFID 2012: 5-6).

Interviews with staff members from HakiElimu and UNICEF

Table 3: Impacts in the area of teacher housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact reported or observed</th>
<th>Nature of evidence to suggest HakiElimu’s actions caused or contributed to impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heightened public awareness of the teacher housing shortfall, followed by increased government focus on the issue and improvements in implementing existing policy commitments and in budget execution. A 2010 parliamentary debate focused on the topic.</td>
<td>Interview with HakiElimu staff suggested this higher public awareness was built up partly by HakiElimu; interview with John Ulanga of the Foundation for Civil Society corroborates this; and HakiElimu 2010 Annual Report (p. 1.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Topic has ascended public agenda and become politically sensitive. Government perceived as striving to respond to shortfall and seeing link between housing and education quality. In 2010 general election campaign, in a national newspaper article President Kikwete accused HakiElimu of misleading public with a TV spot that stated that only 1 percent of the projected teachers’ houses had been built; government called this unfounded. Ruling party MP asked in parliamentary debate why HakiElimu had not been called to account for “misleading” information; Minister of Education backed him and cited number of teachers’ houses built. In paid ads in various media, HakiElimu cited government report from which its figures came, which confirmed the 1 percent. Government directed LGAs to submit figures for past five years, apparently intending to refute 1 percent figure, but this directive evaporated. Funding commitment for teacher housing then increased in 2011 budget.

Table 4: Impacts in the area of capitation grant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact reported or observed</th>
<th>Nature of evidence to suggest HakiElimu’s actions caused or contributed to impact</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Changes in the way budget policy decisions are made, and in who participates in these decisions</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence about funding blockages and leakages compiled by HakiElimu through community-level research by the <em>Friends of Education</em> network influenced government decision to disburse full amount of the secondary-level capitation grant.</td>
<td>Interviews with HakiElimu staff and donor agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Changes in taxation, budget allocations, and budget implementation</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic use by the World Bank of research conducted by <em>Friends</em>, and coordinated and supported by HakiElimu, which monitored transfers of full transfer of CG appears to be correlated with HakiElimu’s broader campaigning efforts and specifically triggered by the dissemination of the research findings and</td>
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</table>
secondary capitation grant to school level (2011). Found that only 20 percent of pledged funds had been delivered. Dissemination of findings influenced government indirectly through pressure brought to bear by donors, leading to full disbursement of secondary-level capitation grant. This is after steady decrease in actual primary capitation grant transfers since its introduction with PEDP I in 2002, and secondary capitation grant disbursements of no more than 10 percent in 2008-2010.

donors’ use of them. Cannot be solely attributed to these: education-sector donors played a significant role as well as other CSOs.

Cited as an impact of HakiElimu in several interviews, including with donor representatives.

DANIDA (2012: 17) cites this as an impact of HakiElimu and Twaweza.
Table 5: Impacts on general governance and advocacy environment, relevant to education budget policy and practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact reported or observed</th>
<th>Nature of evidence to suggest HakiElimu’s actions caused or contributed to impact</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in the way budget policy decisions are made, and in who participates in these decisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Social Services Committee requested and received from HakiElimu capacity strengthening in budget analysis and orientation on how to critically review 2012/13 budget proposal and question Minister of Finance, with view to strengthening social sector allocations. This represents a different approach to the budget policy process: a CSO, by invitation, providing capacity-strengthening and critical edge to a Parliamentary Committee’s response to a budget proposal. This is a government responsiveness impact. We do not have information as to whether this altered the budget’s content; but as stated, HakiElimu’s aims are not to secure specific changes in budget policy but to promote citizen mobilization and government responsiveness and accountability in the education sector, and across general policy and budget context.</td>
<td>Interviews with HakiElimu staff who provided the capacity strengthening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HakiElimu education expert invited and served as discussant at 2011 annual multi-stakeholder Education Sector Review.</td>
<td>2011 ESR Aide Memoire; and interviews with HakiElimu staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview with government official provided as a positive example, HakiElimu’s recent shift to a less confrontational approach.</td>
<td>Interview with government official provided as a positive example, HakiElimu’s recent shift to a less confrontational approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HakiElimu and other CSOs are participating more significantly in policy processes through producing research and local-level monitoring perspectives that are heeded by donors and acted on in their policy dialogue with government, even if government does not heed them directly.</td>
<td>Interviews with staff; two donor representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Caucus comprising 20 young MPs established to argue for specific</td>
<td>Interview with MP (member of caucus) shows that HakiElimu was asked to provide tutelage;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changes to practices and formal and informal rules, or to institutions that govern these practices</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual written submissions on education, governance, and human rights issues have been made to print media.</td>
<td>Interview with director of AcT (Aug 2012), who mentioned this as one finding in AcT’s 2011 Impact assessment exercise. AcT cites this as a positive change in overall accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The relatively “quick and dirty” field-level research conducted by an NGO and its grassroots members appears to have influenced the release of the capitation grant for secondary education, when wielded as evidence by the World Bank. Also cited in Table 4 as a change in budget implementation around capitation grant, this is cited again here as it is far from usual for quick-and-dirty CSO research to be the basis for budget execution decisions, in Tanzania or most other countries. This represents, at least in this one instance and informally rather than formally, a change in practice and rules.</td>
<td>Full transfer of CG appears to be triggered by the dissemination of the research findings and donors’ use of them. Cannot be solely attributed to these: education-sector donors played a significant role, as did other CSOs. Cited as an impact of HakiElimu in several interviews, including with donor representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The building of informal institutional capacity in the form of Tanzanian citizens grouped as Friends of Education, exemplified by its apparently successful action in local-level monitoring of the capitation grant. It is unclear to us whether this capacity has increased, decreased, or stayed same in case study period, but HakiElimu is purposefully supporting and nurturing the tendency.</td>
<td>Focus group discussions with Friends in Shinyanga and Mwanza (Dec 2011); and interviews with two donor representatives and one founding member, board member, and CSO activist</td>
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</table>
Government practices and compliance have started to be routinely monitored by the media over past few years. This was not achieved by HakiElimu, but the organization’s use of mass communications media as a vehicle for disseminating its critiques has helped make the media a domain where policy and budget debates are held and battles are fought, for example in the daily parliamentary highlights program.

Interviews with staff; founding member, board member and CSO activist; and another CSO leader; and focus group discussions in Ukerewe and Njombe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There have been increases in citizen advocacy and investigative journalism and the spawning of critically-minded CSOs.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannot be solely attributed to HakiElimu, but it appears to be related to HakiElimu modeling this kind of approach. Arguably some of the new organizations (e.g., Twaweza) could not operate had HakiElimu not opened spaces for them to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our own observations during fieldwork; interviews with media experts and with founding member, board member and CSO activist; and with another CSO leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania Media Fund's strategy 2012-2016 (Tanzania Media Fund 2011) makes the general point without naming HakiElimu.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Citizens not only claiming rights but also consciously shouldering responsibilities in respect of education, in “self-help” mode.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HakiElimu is probably only one among many factors prompting this, but it does encourage and support “self-help” activities among its Friends of Education and general public</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus group discussions with non-Friend village residents in Iposi village, Njombe</td>
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As one final possible impact of HakiElimu’s work, the PEDP III draft notes the need to increase teacher training and promote the use of Teachers Resource Centers (key elements of the TDMS, upon which HakiElimu has centered a significant amount of advocacy work) and also recognized the shortage of teacher housing. The PEDP III draft identifies these issues as priorities going forward, possibly reflecting the impact of HakiElimu’s advocacy efforts.

There have been negative and adverse impacts too. At least up until 2011, government had little patience with HakiElimu and was wont to vilify it in public debate and newspaper articles, as occurred around the 1 percent implementation figure for teacher housing construction in 2010. An amusing indicator of HakiElimu’s profile and “branding” efforts is that in 2008 in a parliamentary debate HakiElimu was upbraided by a ruling-party MP about
a seemingly negative TV spot related to HIV/AIDS, a sector in which HakiElimu has never worked. A further negative impact has occurred on teachers’ perception of HakiElimu resulting from TV spots and radio coverage that teachers perceive to unfairly undermine them. One *Friend* reported that he was perceived locally as the “enemy of teachers” because of his activism.

In the following section we will weigh up why HakiElimu’s work has both succeeded and failed. For now, suffice it to note that a broad range of outcomes and impacts in the three focal areas we have tracked are raising the political stakes (for both government and the opposition) of inaction and ineffectiveness in the administration of the education sector. While only partial impacts can be detected in HakiElimu’s education-related advocacy objectives, these remain important because they are not only stepping stones toward the full implementation of education policy and budget but are successes and democratic gains in themselves. They also appear to have spillover effects into society and the CSO sector at large, which we will explore further in section F. One possible far-reaching impact — intrinsically very hard to demonstrate — has to do with whether the civic education provided by HakiElimu contributed to more general awareness about the government’s shortcomings, which resulted in the ruling party’s 2010 decline at the polls. While most of our interviewees attributed the decline to the exposure of recent corruption scandals, some affirmed that public awareness campaigns by HakiElimu and others made people notice corruption and lack of responsiveness and to punish the ruling party as a result. It is important to note that HakiElimu did not endorse such a suggestion, and in general does not consciously aim to influence electoral politics, or align itself with opposition parties. Hence, this type of impact, if it were connected to HakiElimu’s work, would represent an unintended consequence.

**Why did the campaign succeed/fail?**

The previous section makes clear that it is difficult to characterize HakiElimu’s activities in the areas of teacher training, teacher housing, and the capitation grant as either “successes” or “failures” since there have been countervailing movements within each area. However, some lessons can be drawn as to what accounted for both the positive and negative developments.

There are a number of organizational factors — strengths, weaknesses, and characteristics of HakiElimu — that count when trying to explain the policy changes that appear to be related to HakiElimu’s actions. One notable strength is the organization’s capacity to produce carefully researched evidence to back its advocacy claims. The importance of collecting rigorous evidence has been noted by HakiElimu staff members — who see it as a shield against government criticism — as well as by HakiElimu’s board members and funders. Tanzania’s education donors have also taken advantage of HakiElimu’s rigorous research in their own advocacy efforts — leading to tangible impacts on the education budget. In one notable example, the World Bank (a key funder of secondary education in Tanzania)

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62 This anecdote is based on one of the author’s recollections of her time working in Tanzania.
63 *Friend* focus group meeting; corroborated by interview with Anthony Mtavango of Tanzania Teachers’ Union.
64 Interviews Rakesh Rajani, Bernadeta Killian, and Richard Mabala.
65 Interviews with Nyanda Shuli, Marjorie Mbilinyi, and Stellan Arvidsson.
used the results of a HakiElimu exercise in monitoring the capitation grant for secondary education to compel the government to release the full disbursement of the grant to schools. The exercise showed that 93 percent of schools surveyed had not received the promised capitation grant for January 2011.

More generally, HakiElimu’s staff exhibit an impressive depth and range of expertise in the areas in which they work, whether in creating provocative and humorous media spots or mobilizing grassroots participation. Indeed, HakiElimu’s ways of working are serving as a model for other advocacy actors, as evinced by the growing number of advocacy organizations using TV spots to get their messages to the public. (This in turn has driven up the prices of TV spots, on which HakiElimu used to secure significant discounts due to their nonprofit social purpose.) Further evidence that HakiElimu’s ways of working have had a “demonstration effect” is the involvement of HakiElimu staff in training other CSOs conducting advocacy and in training journalists in investigative journalism. There is also the birth of organizations and initiatives, such as Twaweza (and its Uwezo initiative), discussed further below, which may not have happened had HakiElimu not opened up a space in which such organizations could operate. In addition, HakiElimu is often singled out as an exemplar of civil society advocacy by its funders.

HakiElimu’s history of confrontation with the government represents another important organizational factor. In 2005 the Government of Tanzania issued an interdiction banning HakiElimu’s TV adverts, and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEVT’s former moniker) informed all schools of its order for HakiElimu to cease undertaking studies, TV spots, and publications about schools; attempts were made to de-register it as an organization, as well. The interdiction was officially lifted in 2007 after a meeting in Dodoma with former Prime Minister Lowassa. That government was led by the same party as the current administration, even if certain key figures in the banning have left key roles in government. We heard different views on whether HakiElimu’s banning has had a lasting impact on perceptions of the organization and on the climate of civil society advocacy at large. While some nongovernmental actors were reportedly cowed by the ban, there was an impressive rallying by citizens and other CSOs during that time. Furthermore, some suggested that HakiElimu was not seen as a “typical” Tanzanian CSO (owing to its outspoken and “atypical” founding director) so other Tanzanian CSOs did not perceive a similar threat. Hence, there is no conclusive view on whether the interdiction had ultimately emboldened or inhibited civil society advocacy.

Where observers concur is on the positive change in HakiElimu’s relationship with government since 2008 under the organization’s new director, Elizabeth Missokia. She was the key actor at the Dodoma meeting in 2007 with former Prime Minister Lowassa that led to HakiElimu’s unbanning. Today’s HakiElimu is assumed to conduct quiet, tactful, behind-

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66 HakiElimu worked with Policy Forum to initiate an exercise to monitor whether the government’s commitment to disburse the grant to schools under SEDP II was being honored. The first phase of the monitoring exercise was carried out between 21 January and 18 March 2011. HakiElimu collected and compiled data through its network of head teachers and volunteer citizens (Friends of Education). Twaweza financed the publishing of the findings (See “Uwazi Monitoring Briefs 2, March 2011”).

67 Interview with Mtemi, who has trained staff of the Tanzania League of the Blind; interview with Kate Dyer, AcT; and focus group with Media Unit.

68 Interview with Kate Dyer, AcT.

69 Interview with Kate Dyer, AcT.
the-scenes political networking as a reinforcement — and perhaps a safety net — for its other, more overt, visible, and “noisy” ways of working, in a sort of “government relationship-management” strategy. This is probably helping to hold open the political space for HakiElimu to operate relatively untrammeled. At the same time, there may be a tension between building and maintaining the bridges in this way while also taking outspoken positions when outspoken positions are demanded by the course of events. As one close observer of the Tanzanian political scene put it, the government thinks you can’t be a friend and also be critical.\textsuperscript{70} As a result, some close observers of the civil society sector in Tanzania suggested that HakiElimu appears to be more cautious in its relationship with government and is generally becoming less visible.\textsuperscript{71}

There have been several staff changes at HakiElimu since 2008, including three changes in the leadership of the Policy Analysis and Advocacy (PAA) unit; some units have seen a complete turnover in staff except for the unit head. For most of the study period, the PAA unit has employed a foreign volunteer for a significant portion of its budget analysis, as it has done ever since HakiElimu started doing this type of work in 2006. Some staff turnover may be attributed to HakiElimu’s support of training and professional opportunities, which include funding staff to take short courses or pursue advanced degrees in relevant subjects. An important staff change was the addition of a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) officer in 2010, who was charged with the challenging task of integrating M&E into the 2008-2011 strategy midstream. His appointment was due to the incoming director’s recognition of the need for more systematic M&E, especially given the M&E challenges that arise from having multiple funding partners.

Another organizational factor that may color HakiElimu’s impact is the lack of coordination among the Friends of Education. While the network’s diversity is a strength in terms of building broad-based support, if its capacity is patchy rather than consistent across the country, this may limit the realization of particular advocacy activities and goals, such as full disbursement of the capitation grant for primary education. Our field visit in December 2011 revealed a significant lack of awareness about education policy among even the most active and connected Friends.\textsuperscript{72} During a focus group discussion in Serengeti district, recommended to us as an area where the Friends network is relatively strong, few of the 19 participants were aware of what the full capitation grant ought to be according to policy, much less whether schools in their area were receiving it.

One of the most active and longstanding members of the group suggested that Friends needed clearer targets. He complained that Friends’ activities are currently too scattered and went on to explain how monitoring would be more effective if it were better coordinated, such that the Friends could speak with one voice. However, a follow-up interview with the manager of the Citizen Engagement program (which coordinates the Friends) revealed that HakiElimu does not want to impose any particular set of activities on the Friends but rather provide them with information and then let them make their own decisions about how to

\textsuperscript{70} John Ulanga, head of Foundation for Civil Society, as paraphrased by Rakesh Rajani in our interview.

\textsuperscript{71} Interviews with Suleman Sumra and Blastus Mwizarubi, December 2011.

\textsuperscript{72} The December field visit was to Friends in the Serengeti and Ukereewe districts. Many of the Friends interviewed have been active since HakiElimu’s founding, as from 2001-2005, HakiElimu had regional offices in these districts. These Friends lamented the fact that HakiElimu had closed these regional offices and suggested that they be re-opened and the Friends be made more official.
Other HakiElimu staff members reported that in its outreach and dissemination activities the organization has never claimed or aspired to universal coverage of the Friends network. While such an approach may permit freedom and innovation, interviews and focus group discussions revealed that many Friends would prefer a closer, more institutionalized relationship with HakiElimu. They suggested re-opening regional offices and providing more regular financial support.

There are also a host of contextual factors external to HakiElimu that may play a part in the policy changes that have occurred in teacher training, teacher housing, and the capitation grant. It is particularly important to reflect on what has happened to the governance context in which this advocacy is carried out over the period of the case study to date. In the remainder of this section we discuss changes in the governance context over the case study period with respect to electoral politics, the role of parliament, the potential for civil society to influence policy making, and the media.

**Electoral politics and the policy process**

The CCM’s hold on power is not as strong as it was in 2008. The most recent presidential elections in 2010 saw the ruling party lose ground substantially. CCM incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete won 61 percent of the vote in the presidential election, significantly less than in 2005, when he won a landslide victory with over 80 percent of the vote. Furthermore, the 2010 election received the lowest voter turnout in Tanzanian history, with only about 43 percent of registered voters going to the polls. According to one analysis of the election results, “CCM’s relative losses may signal Tanzanians’ frustration with the status quo.” The campaigning and parliamentary performance of the main opposition party, Chadema, actively exploit corruption and mismanagement by the government and ruling party, apparently to Chadema’s electoral advantage in 2010.

Reflecting on its significantly lower margin of victory in the 2010 general elections, some observers deduce that the government is striving to win back credibility and legitimacy through taking decisive action against corruption and misconduct, and to behave and appear more accountable. Others feel that internal jockeying for position, in the run up to selecting the 2015 presidential candidate, is leading to some unintended positive outcomes in terms of greater responsiveness and accountability. Public sector discontent is clearly running high; in 2012 it erupted among two core groups — teachers and doctors — and was manifested through official strikes. The last teachers’ strike was in 2009 and very partial in comparison to the 2012 one, which was of a magnitude never seen before.

Whether related to concerns about party image or pre-electoral internal competition, the last few years have seen a continued peddling of the international good governance discourse rhetoric. For instance, in September 2011 Tanzania became one of eight founding members of the Open Government Partnership, a new international initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote more open, responsive, and democratic governance, including increasing budget transparency. In addition, the

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73 PILPG 2010, p. 3.
74 Ibid, p. 4.
75 Interviews Japhet Sanga, Tanzania Media Fund, August 2012; and Semkae Kilonzo, Policy Forum, August 2012.
76 Interview Betty Missokia, HakiElimu, August 2012.
government has been more amenable to inviting CSOs into high-level policy spaces.\footnote{77 Interview with Semkae Kilonzo, Policy Forum.} For example, since 2011 HakiElimu has sat on a MOEVT/UNESCO committee on human rights in education; and on another MOEVT committee on ICTs in education. As HakiElimu’s director noted during our August 2012 visit, “Comparing last year [2011] to this [2012], in terms of acceptance of HakiElimu and relationships with government in general, it has gone up to eight [on a scale of 1-10] from about four, because of persistence and because we are managing to show them that we are not competing with them but can help them.” The very ex-Minister of Education who in 2005 issued the interdiction against HakiElimu informed us that “without [CSOs] citizens’ views would be less informed and effective” and a retired PMO-RALG Director of Education told us that “[CSOs] really come with some reports [...]. We discuss and base our thinking on them.”\footnote{78,79 Interview with Francis Liboy, August 2012.} Other CSO members find that, having been blocked from official spaces a few years ago, they are now invited to more high-level policy spaces than they can cover.\footnote{80 Interview with Semkae Kilonzo, August 2012.} At the level of public perceptions, too, good governance, anti-corruption, and transparency discourses are having an effect: perceptions of corruption have shifted from viewing it as the natural spoils of office, to viewing it as stealing.\footnote{81 Interview Semkae Kilonzo, August 2012.}

There are other factors at play, as one close observer of Tanzanian politics suggested that while the government is worried about its image (in terms of not being too repressive), it is more worried about survival.\footnote{82 Interview with Bernadeta Kilian, August 2012.} Furthermore, opacity persists. During our follow-up visit in December 2011, a number of key education officials (including Director of Teacher Education, the Permanent Secretary and the Director of Policy and Planning) had either just retired or were about to retire and those acting in their stead were not yet making any decisions. As one close observer of the sector explained, “All of these retirements mean there will be huge vacuum in terms of knowing who makes what decisions.”\footnote{83 Interview with Tanya Zebroff, December 2011.} Another concurred that, “the ministry is currently in really poor state [and] doesn’t have the right people” since most officials are “acting.”\footnote{84 Interview with Arun Joshi, December 2011.} Moreover, each incoming minister sets their mark on the sector by introducing a swath of policy reforms, only to see his or her successor arrive and introduce a swath of counter-reforms — the effects of which all the way down the education delivery chain are easy to imagine and impossible to overestimate.

As one close observer of Tanzanian civil society explained, there is a culture of \textit{mjiumo siri} (secret processes) at all levels of government. Indeed, despite a slight increase in Tanzania’s score on the Open Budget Index, its 2010 score of 45 out of 100 indicates that there is still significant room for improvement, and research conducted to inform the 2012 round of the Index shows little change.\footnote{85 International Budget Partnership, “Open Budget Survey 2010,” \url{www.openbudgetindex.org}.} Recent research commissioned by HakiElimu to explore the alignment between curricula and exam content revealed that teachers do not know the content of policies that lay down how they should teach and with what resources.\footnote{86 Research presentation by Professor Kitila Mkumbo, August 2012.} The fact that the Social Services committee — the main parliamentary committee dealing with
education — had to come to HakiElimu for help in understanding the education budget also reveals that it is very difficult to track resources in the sector. This reflects the involvement of multiple ministries in the allocation and execution of education funds, as noted above in Section B.

At present, no government figure at any significant level of seniority openly champions HakiElimu and its work. It is known, anecdotally and also through references made to the organization in parliamentary debates, that MPs use HakiElimu reports to spark and inform public and parliamentary debates. HakiElimu’s 2009 Annual Report recounts how one opposition party (Chadema) in Hai district congratulated HakiElimu on the public expenditure tracking study it carried out there in 2009 and promised to use the results in election campaigning in 2010. It is possible that the opposition’s use of HakiElimu materials contributed to their relative gains in the recent elections. Indeed, HakiElimu has been accused of being an agent of the opposition. In addition, the recently established parliamentary Education Caucus includes a number of opposition MPs, as well as CCM MPs, who view HakiElimu’s work favorably.

In general, the features of the policy process described in section B, particularly the politically driven and incomplete nature of policy implementation, limit the scope for HakiElimu's efforts to impact on budget allocations and budget processes. That said, there are a number of other contextual factors that help to explain HakiElimu’s relative success with respect to interim impacts, such as increased awareness and public debate around teacher training, teacher housing, and the capitation grant.

Parliamentary debates as a space for amplifying HakiElimu’s messages
Despite the Tanzanian Parliament’s statutory weaknesses, in recent years it has become an important forum for public debate. All parliamentary sessions are televised in full, and one channel (Star TV) runs an hour-long daily program of parliamentary highlights. Hence, MPs want to be seen as saying things that will resonate with the public. Parliamentary probes and discussions have been generating wide media coverage and significant public debate. One noteworthy example is a parliamentary probe conducted in early 2008 on energy contracts, which led to the resignation of the powerful Prime Minister and two other prominent ministers; another is the May 2012 sacking (though not prosecution) of six ministers accused by the Controller and Auditor General’s annual report of misuse of funds. Another still is the July 2012 decision of the Speaker of the House to dissolve the parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy and Minerals and investigate its members under suspicion of taking bribes.

Due to such developments as the live TV broadcasting of parliamentary debates and the daily rebroadcast of highlights, there is now a “politics of Parliament in the media.” By making messaging a core political tactic, this live TV coverage has altered the way legislators respond to policy advocacy, meaning that messages of high public interest get taken up and

87 Interview with Rakesh Rajani, 12 August 2011.
89 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17957767
90 Interview with Rakesh Rajani.
debates seeded. Indeed, a number of HakiElimu spots have been the subject of parliamentary debates.

Civil society advocacy techniques and influence

Our interviews reveal mixed views on the ability of civil society advocacy, not only in the education sector, to influence policy. Some say that that civil society has become weaker in recent years, with a tendency for CSOs to be coopted into government, or captured by donor-centric dialogue structures that absorb much energy and time; thus organizations are issuing correspondingly less critique and challenge to government. At the same time, what some see as signs of cooptation others see as growing maturity and diplomacy skills on the CSOs’ part, especially in the case of HakiElimu. In addition, some CSOs’ research and technical expertise, including HakiElimu’s on education, is often seen as better than government technical staff’s own analyses.

Additionally, a few new innovative civil society organizations have emerged in recent years — possibly taking advantage of the space opened up by HakiElimu. One of the most visible is the Uwezo initiative. After conducting nationally representative assessments of learning outcomes, Uwezo launched a bold media campaign highlighting the fact that most Tanzanian primary school students were not performing at grade level. Uwezo’s provocative approach has garnered praise, largely from the donor community, and repudiation, largely from government officials. Indeed, not all donors have been on board with Uwezo’s approach, since they fear risking their good working relations with government. This response to Uwezo reflects a broader dynamic that affects HakiElimu’s ability to make impact. Namely, the government of Tanzania does not like to be criticized.

Changes in the media context and role

One way in which citizens’ voices have been successfully amplified is through the media, and the power of this strategy has not been lost on HakiElimu. Our interviews revealed widespread agreement about the influential role of the media and the government’s use of the media to gauge public opinion. At the same time there were concerns about the media being overly critical (similar to critiques of civil society) and of reaching people in urban areas more easily than those in rural areas.

In recent years, the Tanzanian media has grown considerably, in terms of the number of media outlets and their willingness to be outspoken. Interviewees report a growth in registered media, enormous changes in media pluralism, coverage of government’s actions, and the exposure of corruption and mismanagement scandals. According to one interviewee, “Senior government officials are now afraid of the media,” and their fear is related to low government popularity. Other CSOs are doing critical media spots; even the state-owned Tanzania Broadcasting Company has aired messages that are critical of the

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91 Interviews with Kate Dyer, Rakesh Rajani, and Tanya Zebroff.
92 One proof of this is that the parliamentary Social Sectors Committee requested assistance in budget analysis from HakiElimu, not from government technocrats.
93 Interview with Arun Joshi, December 2011.
94 Interview Bernadeta Killian, Japhet Sanga, and Sanne van den Berg.
95 Interview Bernadeta Killian.
government. The media has come into focus for donor agencies and concerned Tanzanians promoting better governance and accountability, as an area of great potential but as yet limited effectiveness. In 2008 various international donors established the Tanzania Media Fund with the aim of ensuring that the media becomes “a critical player in fostering accountability in Tanzania.” Four years on, it considers this aim far from fulfilled, despite many strengths and successes in its first phase, though some gains have clearly been made.

To return to the title of this section, HakiElimu has both succeeded and failed and a host of reasons and factors are invoked to explain and qualify each judgment. What it is struggling against has been a somewhat moving target. In general, we consider the governance context to have improved slightly over the case study period: time has elapsed since HakiElimu’s banning, key figures have moved on, and some bridges with government have been rebuilt. The ruling party has a more qualified and restricted electoral mandate and with it a greater incentive to strengthen its responsiveness to public opinion and to engage in democratic debate. Apart from the lower order successes and failures that might be registered for each of HakiElimu’s main “pathways to impact,” the case study certainly supports the conclusion drawn by other research that a multi-pronged strategy such as HakiElimu’s is the most effective way to get policy implemented or commitment enacted, perhaps particularly in a context like Tanzania as we have described it. In section F below we broaden our gaze to consider possible alternative explanations for the changes noted in HakiElimu’s areas of focus over the case study period.

Risks and critiques of HakiElimu’s approach

Although the contextual changes noted above have led to some modifications in HakiElimu’s ways of working and emphases, some informed observers continue to critique and suggest alternative ways as more strategic or appropriate. We might interpret these critiques as possible reasons for why HakiElimu was not able to achieve greater success with regards to budget and policy processes. As already noted, the adoption of a less confrontational attitude is widely noted and mainly considered a positive development. Yet some equate it with loss of profile and leadership of the field, and urge HakiElimu to stop announcing to government shortcomings it is already aware of and to “fight with government!” Or, to put it more mildly, to engage more systematically and publicly with the executive and legislature.

The frequent challenge from government and others is that it is easy to criticize from the sidelines and that HakiElimu should invest its funding in what it preaches. This has led to a debate within HakiElimu and its board in 2011 as to whether it should go into delivering education services, using a “model schools” approach. The outcome of this debate was that, in keeping with its present strategy (2012-16), HakiElimu now offers support to local

99 Interview with Joseph Mmbando, former PEDP Coordinator at MOEVT, December 2011.
100 Interviews with Bernadeta Killian and John Ulanga, December 2011.
101 Interview with Joseph Mmbando.
government education staff and School Committee members to better understand and play the roles of the School Committee in terms of governance, accountability, community participation, and transparency. This represents a form of service delivery, but one destined to strengthen school-level accountability and education-quality mechanisms rather than to relieve government of its education delivery obligations.

HakiElimu staff claim that they are ever more conscious of the big picture, increasingly treating the education sector as a complex ecosystem where every action has knock on effects. However, some of the organization’s board members have raised concerns that HakiElimu remains too focused on primary schooling to the exclusion of secondary, or that they ought not to ignore the informal education sector and the rise of private schools. Others rue the fact that HakiElimu has been fairly silent about the government’s insistence on maintaining English as the official language of secondary instruction. HakiElimu staff have also reflected that some of their recent advocacy work on in-service training risks indirectly increasing teacher absenteeism and reducing teacher retention by advocating for more in-service training opportunities. Other issues cited as important for HakiElimu to work more on are inequality (“We are currently building two nations”), the actual processes of budget execution, through increased scrutiny, and pushing the education sector to secure actual outcomes rather than inputs and outputs. Where one commentator appreciates that HakiElimu has always situated its education advocacy firmly within the broader terrain of accountability and democracy advocacy, another sees this as dispersion and opines that HakiElimu should focus on “education [and] forget about accountability!”

Taken as a whole, these critiques reflect HakiElimu’s “guerrilla” strategy: HakiElimu has staked out its terrain — through good research and analysis, relationships with all stakeholders, and an acceptable profile — and then seizes on openings in the political opportunity structure, social dynamics, or the policy process to highlight and advance the relevant areas of interest. The initiation of the TDMS offered an opportunity for concentrated advocacy on teacher training, and the World Bank’s scrutiny of capitation grant disbursements lent notable traction to one of HakiElimu’s monitoring exercises.

While the issues covered in the above paragraph raised a counterview to almost every view expressed, there is one area where our interviewees concur: that the Friends are vital to HakiElimu’s approach and aims, and that HakiElimu is not working with them as effectively as it could. Friends and local government actors whom we met on our field visits had a host of suggestions as to how the relationship could lead to more effective grassroots mobilization, including institutionalization of the relationship; funding from HakiElimu to

102 Interview with Betty Missokia, Nyanda Shuli, and Mtemi Zombwe, December 2011.
103 Interview with Richard Mahala, August 2012.
104 Interview with Marjorie Mbilinyi, August 2012.
105 Interview with Suleman Sumra, December 2011.
106 Interview with Betty Missokia, Nyanda and Mtemi, December 2011.
107 Interview with Zitto Kabwe MP, December 2011.
108 Interview with Sumra Saleman, December 2011.
109 Interview with Bernadeta Killian, August 2012.
110 Interview with John Ulanga, December 2011.
According to one well-placed observer, “HakiElimu won’t win the policy battle until the grassroots mobilize more.”

Some of HakiElimu’s tactics and approaches undoubtedly carry risks — to the organization’s impact, as well as to position and relationships. We found great sensitivity about the naming-and-shaming and “billboard” approaches used by some CSOs (Uwezo in particular, but HakiElimu, too) to try to embarrass or shame the government into responding. Terms used to describe these were “insults,” “a mockery of teachers,” and “too far”; “HakiElimu will take one bad case and over-promote it,” said one observer. Perhaps the greatest risk herein is the alienation of teachers, who could and should be cultivated as crucial allies. One close observer of the education sector also speculated that by criticizing the public education system, HakiElimu and its allies might mainly serve to encourage parents to exercise “exit” (by shifting their children to private schools) rather than “voice” (by raising their concerns and trying to make the public education system work). He further noted that even if the critical thinking that HakiElimu foments causes the ruling party to fall from power, a change of government would not necessarily lead to advances in the education sector.

Voices from the grassroots in Serengeti and Ukerewe said that use of the media, especially the print media, does not reach all people in rural areas and that radio should be used more for grassroots information and mobilization. And from our own observations, there is a risk that in its hands-off mode of support to Friends, HakiElimu might be unwittingly exacerbating inequitable, undemocratic power relations and petty “dictatorships at the village level” by creating spaces in which male domination is the norm and goes unchallenged and unaddressed.

**Alternative explanations of impact**

In the previous section we posited that the main way in which positive changes to teacher training, teacher housing, and the capitation grant, patchy and partial as they are, seem to have come about is through government responding when it fears the political cost of inaction. The way that HakiElimu has sought to create these moments and respond to them is through a multi-pronged strategy that addresses the problem through both informed advocacy at central government level and mobilization at the grassroots. This seems to have been effective at raising the stakes for government. Whereas there appears to be no major contending hypothesis as to how government responsiveness has been achieved, what is debatable is how much impact other actors have had in instances when the balance of the political calculation has tipped in favor of HakiElimu’s key causes. In this section, then, we discuss not alternative hypotheses but three actor groups whose actions may constitute alternative or complementary explanations for the changes identified, to greater or lesser degrees.

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111 FGDs in Ukerewe and Serengeti, December 2011; interviews with local government staff in Ukerewe and Serengeti, December 2011; interview with Kate Dyer, AcT, August 2011; interview with Tanya Zebroff, DFID, August 2011; and interview with Minou Fuglesang, August 2011.
112 Interview with Richard Mabala, August 2012.
113 Interview with Joseph Mmbando, August 2012; Sumra Suleman, December 2011; Joseph Mungai, August 2012.
114 Interview with Stellan Arvidsson, August 2012.
115 Focus Group Discussions in Ukerewe and Serengeti December 2011; and interviews with local government staff in Ukerewe and Serengeti, December 2011.
116 Interview with Richard Mabala; and field visits.
Donor agencies, or “development partners” as they are called in Tanzania, have surely played a significant role. While they themselves lament how little influence they seem to have, they are nonetheless considered highly influential by everyone else we interviewed, except for a few sovereignty-conscious government officials. The funding provided to the education sector by DFID, Sida, the World Bank, CIDA, and UNESCO, in particular, has been key to the advances made and, we can only assume, also key to leveraging from government a degree of compliance with its own targets. The period of our case study captures an interesting shift in donor behavior: from funding primary education directly with ring-fenced funds using PEDP I, and switching to general budget support (GBS) when PEDP II began — at which point primary capitation grant transfers declined. Education donors have since pulled back from GBS and are designing a program for their continued (very substantial) funding of primary education.  

More broadly, donors the world over are simultaneously intensifying their efforts to help partner countries meet at least some of the Millennium Development Goals, and stepping up the pressure for demonstrable results from their aid. In the case of DFID Tanzania, this latter priority is key to the 2012 decision to pull back from GBS, given how hard it is under GBS to demonstrate any single donor’s aid impact in any kind of governance environment, let alone one as complex and intractable as Tanzania’s. It is conceivable that the Tanzanian government’s apparent efforts to clean up its image are a response to pressure applied by donors, and also that government’s preference for GBS is driving a compliant government response to these pressures. Under GBS, the Tanzanian government plays a major role in setting targets that serve as triggers for disbursements. Some of the recent targets agreed to by donors and government included full release of the capitation grant for secondary education and building teachers’ houses.

An obvious set of actors to consider in this section are other CSOs. We have discussed that HakiElimu works with others, such as TEN/MET and Policy Forum and, lately, Uwezo and Teachers’ Resource Centers. Policy Forum holds that as a network, its role is more to provide spaces for members like HakiElimu to communicate their policy advocacy, than to do the advocacy itself as Policy Forum. As noted above, TEN/MET was universally considered to be at low ebb over the case study period by all those consulted on it. There is no doubt that Uwezo’s findings, starkly publicized, have raised public awareness and concern about the issues HakiElimu is has been working on. Among these CSOs, which have clearly contributed to varying extents to the advances noted, HakiElimu was considered the leader in the education field, and by some as the trailblazer in terms of critical, adversarial, and, now, collaborative advocacy.

As noted earlier, we cannot set a great deal of store in responses we drew to our “counterfactual thought-experiment” question. Suffice it to note that we made a point of asking it of all our government interviewees, and all but one responded that without civil society advocacy on education, government would prioritize, perform, and spend public

118 Independent Commission on Aid Impact 2012.
119 Interview with Tanya Zebroff, DFID Tanzania, December 2011.
money less well.\textsuperscript{120} CSO and donor interviewees almost universally considered their role important in achieving advances, holding back retrogressions, and, in some cases, in bearing witness to citizens’ rights in a context where these are routinely left unrealized.\textsuperscript{121}

Ultimately, and hardly surprisingly, it seems reasonable to conclude that the positive changes in HakiElimu’s focal areas result from a convergence of efforts by all these sets of actors, working in parallel and occasionally in tandem in both formalized and informal collaboration. In addition to the specific impact achieved by HakiElimu listed in Tables 2-5 above, their influence in at least the education sector is underlined further by the fact that they were closely engaged with all the actors and issues listed as alternative explanations above.

Conclusion

What can be learnt from this case study? What can be learnt about the ways in which CSOs seek to influence government?

Drawing general lessons from this case study requires placing HakiElimu in its proper context — operating in an aid-dependent country where the policy process is highly politicized, subject to the whims of foreign aid donors, and relatively opaque. And yet despite these deep democratic deficits, Tanzania is a democracy, if a highly imperfect one. The ruling party knows that it cannot completely ignore the wants and needs of Tanzania’s citizens if it wants to maintain its grip on power. This is the nature of accountability in Tanzania. As Rajani puts it, “Governments do the right thing (or less of the bad thing) not because of compelling evidence, good policies or effective lobbying; but because it pays to do so or there is no way out. Accountability is political, not technical.”\textsuperscript{122} HakiElimu has taken this lesson to heart. Rather than target specific policy actors to implement specific changes to budgetary allocations, HakiElimu looks for strategic entry points and then reacts in ways that resonate with the public, and ultimately raise the stakes on government inaction on its promises.

As noted above, such an approach entails a high degree of risk, and also makes it difficult to track HakiElimu’s impact. But a careful reading of the policy context in Tanzania suggests that it is still likely to be more effective than an approach based on targeted advocacy directed toward particular policy and budget developments. By building a strong organization with the capacity to engage on multiple levels, HakiElimu also makes sure that it has its bases covered, in terms of conducting its own careful research, crafting attention-getting media spots, and sharing popularized information with a wide range of audiences all across Tanzania. In sum, while the lessons that can be drawn from HakiElimu’s experience apply primarily to CSOs operating in similar country contexts, it is worth remembering that budget and policy processes are almost always political, and so working to get the public “on your side” is likely to be an important element of any successful strategy for CSOs working in countries at all levels of democracy.

\textsuperscript{120} Interviews with Joseph Mungai, August 2012; Francis Liboy, August 2012; two MOEVT Department of Policy and Planning technicians; and John Senzighe, December 2011.

\textsuperscript{121} Interviews with Stellan Arvidsson and Omar Mzee, August 2012; Semkae Kilonzo, August 2012; Samuel Wangwe, August 2012; Japhet Sanga, August 2012; and Bernadeta Kilian, August 2012.

\textsuperscript{122} Rakesh Ranjani, 2007.
How do the findings of this case study relate to the findings of existing literature on civil society impact? Contemporary work on the real-life nature of policy processes and advocacy initiatives, especially but not only in Southern countries, identify a series of factors that characterize successful policy advocacy and campaigning initiatives, many of which resonate with our observations of HakiElimu. Among these are the use of a multi-pronged approach that engages diverse change agents in vertical and horizontal alliances and combines professional advocacy with citizen mobilization through various means; political agility in responding to political opportunities that arise in a fluid policy context and dynamic political landscape; and the importance of framing a campaign right, so as to generate mobilization and enough coalescence of actors to overcome opposition. Consciously or not, HakiElimu has hit on a framing or construction of the “problem” that is compelling at the grassroots level while also entirely legitimate among all other parties, even the highest policy-making echelons, thus limiting opponents’ ability to mobilize their own forces in return. It thus appears very closely aligned with the most salient recommendations of contemporary policy advocacy scholarship.

Another recent and empirically based study of citizen action argues:

“[…] democracy is not built by political institutions or developmental interventions alone. Taking a broader societal view, [other vital elements are] the conditions under which citizen mobilization has successfully contributed to the articulation of citizens’ concerns, the promotion of democratic change and the pressuring of states to act more accountably and democratically.”

The authors conclude that to understand the impacts of associations, social movements and citizen participation in the formal institutional spaces of governance, an “integrated analytical approach” is needed that “explores the particular contribution of each of these forms of citizen mobilization to the deepening of democracy, separately and in combination with others, in differing contexts.” They call for greater attention to understanding the combined effects of citizen mobilization and the politics of public participation.

One less-than-perfect fit between HakiElimu and contemporary literature relates to coalitions. Much of the literature stresses the centrality of working in coalition for a successful campaign. HakiElimu seems to be only fairly loosely associated with a coalition at present, though in a way the Friends of Education might be thought of as a coalition in the form of its grassroots social base. A number of Tanzanian CSOs nonetheless replicate aspects of the HakiElimu “brand” — particularly in terms of media work — which helps to create implicit alliances at some level.

Methodologically speaking, this case study, with its innovation of longitudinal case-study research, posed challenges that should be explored further. One of the main methodological

123 Gaventa J. and R. McGee (Eds) 2010, This work is based on analysis of eight detailed case studies, plus an in-depth and extensive review of up-to-the-moment literature on policy processes, NGO advocacy, local and global citizen action, and social movements.
124 Leach & Scoones, 2007, p. 11; and Covey 1995, p. 862.
126 Ibid, p. 18.
127 As reviewed in Gaventa and McGee, 2010.
challenges posed by this case study was the proposition of working within the confines of a predetermined, all-encompassing Theory of Change (ToC). A ToC diagram was produced earlier in this case study process, which represents graphically the four outcomes above and how the full range of the organization’s activities, strategies and outputs are expected to contribute to them. This was supplanted by a slightly modified and simplified one in the current (2012-2015) strategy. We started our work on this case study by attempting to map developments using a simplified version of the first Theory of Change, having elicited and received an initial validation of this as the current ToC by HakiElimu staff members we interviewed on our first field visit. We gradually became aware that this ToC was to a great extent an artifact of this IBP-supported case study and/or IBP program support. As such, there was a risk that an enquiry into impact framed closely around the ToC would generate spurious findings and find little ownership or echo among HakiElimu staff. As noted above, we decided it would be better to unearth an implicit “lived” Theory of Change — what people do all day — which we have expressed in text form in section C above and which does not include defined spheres of influence or linear relationships of cause and effect between certain actions and certain outcomes and impacts. This revised approach proved to be sound as the more inductive approach, and the resulting wider field of vision enabled us to apprehend the organization’s ways of working as they are rather than as donor-backed project management tools would have them be. On the other hand, de-prioritizing the ToC in researching HakiElimu’s impact may weaken the basis for robust contribution analysis, as this generally requires an explicit, sound ToC.

Related to the issues above, having researchers work closely with their research subjects over an extended period of time requires a shared understanding of the research objectives and process, which can be difficult to achieve. Indeed, a lack of shared vision led to the termination of the previous team of researchers working on this case study and our involvement in the work part-way through. Furthermore, the fact that this particular longitudinal case study was conducted by researchers who were not based in the country (and who took over from a previous team in the middle of the research process) meant that it ended up being more of an in-depth study covering three years, rather than carefully tracking developments over time. This challenge also stems from the fact that the case study does not focus on a single, well-defined and time-bound campaign, which might better lend itself to such a research frame.

Certain areas of HakiElimu’s work and approach merit careful reflection by the organization and possibly further exploration. HakiElimu strives hard to be a learning organization, a quality claimed by many CSOs but displayed by few. It has made commendable advances in learning from its own experience, for example, conducting media monitoring and rural field visits to do “reality checks.” This learning approach could be strengthened in three dimensions. Firstly, an important way that HakiElimu attains impact seems to be by upping the political and electoral costs of government inaction, yet this is not articulated as a strategy, and happens at a more intuitive level. This leaves a sense of slight misfit between the written strategy and what HakiElimu staff do all day. If HakiElimu actually articulated this element of its strategy and planned for it, it may be able to increase its effectiveness and impact. It may choose not to do so overtly and publicly in order to avoid kindling further

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128 Attached as Annex 3.
129 Attached as Annex 4.
antagonism in its relationship with government. But we submit that even articulating internally this element of its strategy, and seeing it through logically into changes in practice — such as conducting routine, systematic, political context analysis and using the resulting insights to revise planned actions — could enhance its impact.

Secondly, the organization’s vision for change is based on a transformative vision for the country. Yet its monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting do not focus on that vision and on the transformative impact sought by the whole organization, rather it places more emphasis on outputs by unit. This approach does not do justice to all the organization stands for and achieves. By constructing a more transformative approach to M&E&L (monitoring evaluation and learning), staff could focus less on the outputs they are committed to producing and more on the change they want to bring about. That said, an organization working in an environment where aid and aid donors are dominant, has to take account of development aid trends to ensure its own future. At present the donor agencies’ emphasis on “development for results” tends to discourage bold approaches to M&E&L that emphasize learning and transformation rather than more concrete results.

A third and last learning challenge for HakiElimu is to find ways to assess impact in the form of “raised consciousness” and trace the routes from this into citizen engagement, social accountability, national and local political dynamics, and citizens’ electoral behavior. This amounts to working at the overlap between civil and political society, adopting a more “integrated analytical approach,” as called for in the citation above.

Earlier we cited Fox’s maxim that it is hard to shame the shameless. This case study confirms that it is difficult, but also strongly suggests that it is possible, if and when the shaming jeopardizes something they prize — in this case, a continued hold on political power by the party that has governed Tanzania for the last 50 years. The year 2015 is approaching, bringing Tanzania’s general elections and intensified donor efforts and funds for education as the end-date for the MDGs looms. Until then at least, the scope for HakiElimu to raise the stakes continues to grow.
Annex 1. Methodology and Context of Primary Fieldwork

This research was conducted through a series of three fieldwork visits by the two authors in August 2011, December 2011, and August 2012. Their fieldwork built on the efforts of a previous team of consultants to a limited extent. On each visit the authors conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with HakiElimu staff members and a range of other kinds of actors variously connected to the education sector in Tanzania (other civil society actors, donor agency staff, Tanzanian government elected representatives and civil servants, and members of the public, listed in full in Annex 2, by date of each field visit).

While most of the authors’ research took place in Dar es Salaam, the case study was also informed by a field visit by one of the authors to Ukerewe and Serengeti districts in Northern Tanzania, where she interviewed a number of Friends of Education and other community members with some connection to the Friends movement. Both authors also met with a focus group of Friends during their August 2011 visit, which was convened by HakiElimu.

In addition, the authors commissioned Daraja, a Tanzanian NGO working to promote local government accountability, to conduct four focus group discussions in a village in Njombe district, in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. The primary purpose of these focus group discussions was to get a sense of whether and how HakiElimu's key messages are reaching the average citizen, and what they are doing with this information.

According to Daraja staff, the village where they conducted the focus group discussions is a typical one in Njombe. It is rural with little to no urban characteristics and has a population of about 4,000 people. The village’s main source of income is agriculture. Villagers complain that middlemen do not give them a fair price for their products. While many parents in the village have only primary school-level education, some are making efforts to put their children through secondary school and even university.

While the villagers have a reliable source of water (provided by a private individual) they lament the lack of a proper health center and poor education services due to the lack of teachers. Like most of Njombe, the roads are in bad condition, as well with fares for public transport shooting up during the rainy season when roads become almost impassible.

While the village has been a stronghold of the ruling CCM party, the opposition party Chadema has been making inroads with support from youth.
Annex 2. List of People Interviewed for Case Study

August 2011 Visit
1. Kate Dyer, Accountability in Tanzania (AcT), financed by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID)
2. Bernadeta Kilian, Dean, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Dar es Salaam
3. David Kafulila, former Member of Parliament, NCCR-Mageuzi (opposition political party)
4. Pius Makomelelo, Citizen Engagement Manager, HakiElimu (and other unit staff)
5. Robert Mihayo, Information Access Manager, HakiElimu (and other unit staff)
6. Elizabeth Missokia, Executive Director, HakiElimu
7. Antony Mtavangu, Tanzania Teachers Union
8. Charles Mtoi, Monitoring and Evaluation Head, HakiElimu
9. Rakesh Rajani, Head, Twaweza (also founding Director of HakiElimu)
10. Nyanda Shuli, Media Manager, HakiElimu (and other unit staff)
11. Suleman Sumra, Director, Uwezo Tanzania
12. Audax Tibuhinda, Program Officer, UNICEF
13. Tanya Zebruff, DFID

December 2011 Visit
1. Arun Joshi, World Bank
2. Zitto Kabwe, Member of Parliament, Chadema (opposition political party)
3. Elizabeth Missokia, Executive Director, HakiElimu
4. Joseph Mbando, MOEVT (retired)
5. Blastus Mwizarubi, CARE International
6. Ezekiel Oluoch, Tanzania Teachers’ Union
7. John Senzighe, MOEVT
8. Nyanda Shuli, Media Manager, HakiElimu
9. John Ulanga, Foundation for Civil Society
10. Tanza Zebruff, DFID
11. Mtemi Zombwe, Policy Analysis and Advocacy, HakiElimu

August 2012 Visit
1. Stellan Arvidsson, SIDA
2. Kate Dyer, AcT
3. Minou Fuglesang, Femina
4. Kees de Graaf, Twaweza
5. Bernadeta Kilian, University of Dar es Salaam
6. Semkae Kilonzo, Policy Forum
7. Francis Liboy, PMO-RALG (retired)
8. Helen Lihawa, Director of Teacher Training (interviewed with four colleagues from department)
9. Richard Mabala, HakiElimu founding member, TAMASHA (a local civil society organization)
10. Marjorie Mbilinyi, HakiElimu founding member, Tanzania Gender Networking Program
11. Elizabeth Missokia, Executive Director, HakiElimu
12. Fausta Atu Musokwa, Research and Policy Analysis, HakiElimu
13. Omar Mzee, SIDA
14. Joseph Mungai, former Minister of Education
15. Egbert Ndauka, Director of Policy and Planning, MOEVT
16. Japhet Sanga, Tanzania Media Fund
17. Nyanda Shuli, Media Manager, HakiElimu
18. Sanne Van Den Berg, Tanzania Media Fund
20. Marystella Wassena, Acting Commissioner, MOEVT
Annex 3. HakiElimu’s Theory of Change

Figure 1. Theory of Change diagram produced by previous team of consultants
Figure 2. Theory of Change from HakiElimu's 2012-2016 Strategy

**Theory of Change**

**Overall Goal:** *An Open, Just and Democratic Society with Quality Education for All*

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*Quality is never an accident; it is always the result of high intention, sincere effort, intelligent direction and skillful execution; it represents the wise choice of many alternatives.* - William J. Foster

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Court, M., D. Osborne, and J. Young, “Policy Engagement: How NGOs can be more effective,” Overseas Development Institute, London, 2006.


HakiElimu “Case Study,” n.d.


HakiElimu, “Education in Reverse: Is PEDP II Undoing the Progress of PEDP I?” Brief No. 10.1E, February 2010.


United Republic of Tanzania, in collaboration with the Pôle de Dakar (UNESCO/BREDA), the UNESCO Institute of Statistics, and the UNESCO Dar es Salaam cluster office, Tanzania Education Sector Analysis,” 2011.